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Abstract 
Much has been written about Magna Carta, particularly given its recent 800th birthday.  Yet 
few are prepared to speak against this ancient document for fear that the rule of law, liberty, 
and even democracy might crumble if Magna Carta no longer stands.  This paper argues that 
Magna Carta should be repealed.  First, by studying both Magna Carta’s history and the 
relevant New Zealand case law, this paper establishes that Magna Carta no longer has any 
discernible practical use.  Though it once represented rights against the monarch, it is now 
out of date, predominantly misused and is therefore obsolete.  Building upon this conclusion 
the paper argues that little of what Magna Carta supposedly stands for can in fact be justified 
by legitimate statutory interpretation approaches.  Even a generous, purposive approach is 
not enough to transform Magna Carta from a feudal document signed to end a civil war into 
a sure guarantee of rights and principles in modern New Zealand.  Furthermore, Magna 
Carta does not live up to the rule of law it supposedly epitomises.  It is an unnecessary, 
overly detailed and inaccessible piece of legislation.  Finally, it is argued that New Zealand’s 
constitutional framework would be better off without Magna Carta.  New Zealand’s ability to 
provide effective rights protection and adhere to the rule of law does not depend on the 
charter signed at Runnymede.  Excessive reverence for the past robs New Zealanders of a 
constitutional framework that suits our unique nation.  On this basis, the paper concludes 
that Magna Carta should be repealed. 
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The text of this paper (excluding the abstract, table of contents, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 12,988 words. 
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I Introduction 
And still when mob or Monarch lays 
Too rude a hand on English ways,  
The whisper wakes, the shudder plays,  
Across the reeds at Runnymede. 
And Thames, that knows the moods of kings,  
And crowds and priests and suchlike things,  
Rolls deep and dreadful as he brings 
Their warning down from Runnymede! 
(Rudyard Kipling, 1911)1 
For 800 years Magna Carta has warned monarchs against overstepping the line drawn at 
Runnymede.  To Magna Carta democracy is attributed; from it the rule of law draws its 
beginnings; in it liberty finds its source.  Or so myth would have it.  As well as being 
formative in England’s constitutional structure, Magna Carta inspired the American 
Declaration and has been referred to in many circumstances including King Charles I’s trial, 
the Watergate scandal and Nelson Mandela’s defence in court.2  Yet it is more than a fondly 
remembered historical relic; it is a New Zealand statute. 
Unfortunately, the glistening jewel of English legal history is not the heirloom it was once 
thought to be.  For 800 years the ever-growing myth of Magna Carta has misled lawyers and 
judges.  Just as a story handed down through generations grows in magnitude and grandeur 
but also further from the truth, over time Magna Carta has come to stand for more than it did 
in June of 1215.  This is the myth of Magna Carta; the inappropriate attribution to that 
document of various values and rights.  It is time it was removed from New Zealand’s 
constitutional crown and room made for a more indigenous commitment to the rule of law.  
Magna Carta should be repealed and its ideas incorporated into another modern, New 
Zealand-made constitutional document. 
Part II establishes a foundation for the rest of the paper.  First, it provides a brief history of 
Magna Carta.  Secondly, Magna Carta’s use in New Zealand courts is analysed.  The 
authority Magna Carta provides for a number of substantive rights is addressed followed by 
an exploration of its symbolic value.  This part questions the authority that Magna Carta 
provides for certain principles, highlights textual ambiguities and uncertainties and 
determines its overlap with other legislation.  It concludes that Magna Carta has been made 
irrelevant by modern statutes. 
                                                 
1  Rudyard Kipling “What Say the Reeds at Runnymede?” (1911). 
2  Dan Jones “How did a peace treaty from 1215 forge the freedoms of 2015?” BBC (online ed, United 
Kingdom, 2015); Bonnie Greer “Why Do Americans Think the Magna Carta is So Awesome?” BBC 
(online ed, United Kingdom, 2015). 
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The paper then moves into a normative critique of Magna Carta.  Part III concerns how 
Magna Carta should be interpreted.  It argues that the myth of Magna Carta cannot be 
justified through ordinary statutory interpretation techniques.  Treating it as a constitutional 
document achieves better results, but for reasons discussed, this approach is still unsuitable.  
Part IV explores some of the characteristics imposed on statutes by the rule of law and 
whether Magna Carta possesses them.  However Magna Carta’s supposed legacy - the rule of 
law - proves too rigorous a standard for Magna Carta to meet. 
Part V draws the preceding arguments together.  Magna Carta does not have what it takes to 
be a quality constitutional component.  New Zealanders are more likely to buy into a 
constitutional document that is made specifically for New Zealand.  Furthermore it is 
preferable to base our rights protection on a statute designed to suit New Zealand values with 
unambiguous language.  The reticence among the legal profession to relinquish historical 
foundations is also addressed.  The relevant constitutional values will not be lost if Magna 
Carta is no longer a statute in New Zealand. 
 II Magna Carta: Modern New Zealand Usage 
The fundamental test of a statute’s relevancy is the way the courts deal with it.  Some New 
Zealand cases still refer to Magna Carta.  First, Section A provides an overview of Magna 
Carta’s history and how it came to be part of New Zealand law.  This Part then considers how 
Magna Carta is used as both law and as a symbol.  Hence Section B looks at the substantive 
rights that form the law under Magna Carta.  Section C looks at the principles derived from 
Magna Carta and whether such derivation is justified.  Finally, Section D discusses a few 
overarching themes of Magna Carta’s usage. 
A Historical Background 
It is important to understand the motivations of those responsible for Magna Carta and its 
post-enactment development in order to understand why it is used the way it is today.  In 
1215 King John was at war with the feudal barons.3  Magna Carta, signed at Runnymede, was 
an attempt to end this war.4  The barons had rebelled against the misgovernment and 
continued exploitation of their financial resources by the Norman and Angevin kings.5  Prior 
to the Norman Conquest English customary law involved mutual rights and obligations 
between king and citizens; this was an early form of the predominance of the law.  But the 
                                                 
3  William Sharp McKechnie Magna Carta: A Commentary on the Great Charter of King John (James 
Maclehose and Sons, Glasgow, 1914) at 51. 
4  JC Holt Magna Carta (2nd ed, Cambridge University Press, Great Britain, 1992) at 26. 
5  At 27. 
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Norman and Angevin kings increasingly ignored their obligations and abused their rights.6  
King John’s increasingly severe actions brought the brewing rebellion to a head.7  The barons 
aimed to reform English governance.8  Their reform was modelled on the “good old law” 
from before the Norman Conquest.9  Hence Magna Carta, reluctantly accepted by King John, 
reigned in his liberties and reasserted the law’s predominance.  After two months the Pope 
had it annulled for infringing John’s “God-given rights as monarch”.10  After John’s death in 
1216 the barons exploited his heir’s infancy to reissue the Charter.11 
Subsequently Magna Carta has been reissued numerous times.12  It has also been 
reinterpreted, modified and grown in status.  Significant credit for Magna Carta’s 
constitutional position can be attributed to Sir Edward Coke’s writings.13  He affirmed its 
“great weightiness” as a restatement of customary laws.14  He also significantly reinterpreted 
it, asserting that it stood for property rights, due process, jury trials and no taxation without 
parliamentary consent.15 
Magna Carta’s reissue in 1297 was most likely the first time it was given statutory force.16  
Chapter 29 of that reissue was part of New Zealand law under the English Laws Act 1908 
and before that the English Laws Act 1858.17  It remains part of New Zealand law according 
to the Imperial Laws Application Act 1988 (ILAA).18  It says:19 
                                                 
6  At 27; Ivor Jennings Magna Carta: And Its Influence in the World Today (Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 
London, 1965) at 13. 
7  Ralph V Turner Magna Carta: Through the Ages (Pearson Education, Great Britain, 2003) at 43 and 45–
46; McKechnie, above n 3, at 49. 
8  Turner, above n 7, at 52. 
9  At 67; Holt Magna Carta, above n 4, at 297. 
10  Turner, above n 7, at 77. 
11  At 78. 
12  JW Gough Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History (Oxford University Press, London, 1955) 
at 16. 
13  Max Radin “The Myth of Magna Carta” (1947) 60 HLR 1060 at 1061. 
14  Gough, above n 12, at 40. 
15  Turner, above n 7, at 148–149. 
16  JC Holt “Magna Carta: Law and Constitution” in JC Holt (ed) Magna Carta and the Idea of Liberty (John 
Wiley and Sons, United States of America, 1972) 49 at 53. 
17  Re Arnold and Others [1977] 1 NZLR 327 (SC) at 334. 
18  Imperial Laws Application Act 1988, s 3(1) and sch 1.  Note that some sources refer to chapter 29 whilst 
others refer to chapter 39.  They are both references to the same chapter.  Magna Carta’s clauses were not 
originally numbered and various reissues used different numbering.  Since no other chapter is in force in 
New Zealand, this paper’s arguments concern chapter 29 exclusively. 
19  Magna Carta 1297 (Imp) 25 Edw I, c 29. 
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NO freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his freehold, or 
liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; 
nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his 
peers, or by the law of the land.  We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer 
to any man either justice or right. 
The ILAA was passed in order to clarify how old English statutes should be used in New 
Zealand and to expressly retain any statutes deemed necessary.20  There are several possible 
motivations behind including Magna Carta in the ILAA.  It is likely that Parliament wanted to 
demonstrate a connection between New Zealand’s constitutional structure and its English 
history as well as reaffirm New Zealand’s adherence to the rule of law.21  The legal 
profession seems to have a sentimental attachment to Magna Carta.22  It was also likely that 
the legal profession desired its retention until some more comprehensive analysis of its 
usefulness could be undertaken.23 
B Magna Carta as Law 
Despite its age, Magna Carta is still cited by New Zealand litigants.  Whether this indicates 
its continued relevance depends on the nature of that use.24  Hence the following sections 
look extensively at how Magna Carta is used by the courts.25 
This analysis has some limitations.  First, the cases were not randomly selected; the databases 
usually present them in chronological order.  This means the data favours more recent cases.  
However where all the search results were exhausted this limitation was eliminated.  
Secondly, some cases contain references to Magna Carta without listing it as cited legislation 
so would not be found by the search parameters.  Thirdly, there are some cases where the 
judges’ summary of excluded parties’ arguments merely referred to “old statutes”.  This 
makes it difficult to know whether the parties referred to Magna Carta or not.  Despite these 
limitations, this case analysis provides an informative overview of Magna Carta’s use in New 
Zealand. 
Before looking at the substantive rights, there are some general statistics regarding Magna 
Carta’s use that are interesting.  First, the most frequent type of case in which Magna Carta 
                                                 
20  Jeremy Finn “The Imperial Laws Application Act 1988” (1989) 4 Canterbury L Rev 93 at 94. 
21  David Clark “The Icon of Liberty: The Status and Role of Magna Carta in Australian and New Zealand 
Law” (2000) 24 MULR 866 at 870. 
22  Finn, above n 20, at 97; Clark, above n 21, at 870. 
23  McVeagh v Attorney-General [2001] 3 NZLR 566 (HC) at [22]. 
24  Clark, above n 21, at 868. 
25  Eighty-five cases were found primarily by searching several legal databases with Magna Carta in the 
“legislation cited” field.  Cases were also found because they were referred to in other cases or in journal 
articles. 
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was referred to was criminal or criminal procedure cases, followed by civil procedure, then 
administrative and constitutional law cases.  Secondly, forty per cent of litigants relied on the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Bill of Rights Act) alongside Magna Carta.  This was 
done most frequently regarding the rights to justice and minimum standards of criminal 
procedure.26  Thirdly, even where judges admitted the constitutional value of Magna Carta, 
they did not rely on Magna Carta in order to reach their final conclusion.27  Fourthly, in over 
three quarters of the cases where Magna Carta was referred to, the litigant relying on Magna 
Carta lost.  Finally, self-representation rates are unusually high in Magna Carta cases.  
Roughly half of the cases that expressly indicate that the litigant raised Magna Carta involved 
self-representation.  This is over five times the usual rate in New Zealand.28 
One key way in which Magna Carta is used is as authority for substantive rights against the 
abuse of executive power.  The approach of the courts to six commonly relied upon rights is 
now discussed. 
First, many New Zealand litigants trace the right to due process back to Magna Carta’s phrase 
per legum terrae.29  It is alleged to cover areas such as the right to a hearing,30 to be present 
during that hearing,31 to call certain witnesses32 and to be permitted to make particular 
arguments.33  Unfortunately these cases do not discuss Magna Carta in much detail.  This 
may be due to there being no breach or the argument concerning Magna Carta being 
irrelevant to the appeal.34  For instance, in one High Court case the applicants claimed their 
common law right of access to justice could be traced back to Magna Carta.35  The Judge said 
that the right’s legal source was unimportant; it was enough that it was deeply embedded in 
                                                 
26  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, ss 25 and 27. 
27  Similarly, in Joshua Rozenberg “Magna Carta in the modern age” British Library <www.bl.uk>, 
Rozenberg said that he has “not found a single modern English case that was decided on the strength of 
Magna Carta alone”. 
28  Melissa Smith, Esther Banbury and Su-Wuen Ong Self-Represented Litigants: An Exploratory Study of 
Litigants in Person in the New Zealand Criminal Summary and Family Jurisdictions (Ministry of Justice, 
July 2009) at 10.  Interestingly, sixteen per cent of these cases were represented by one particular counsel, 
T Ellis. 
29  “by the law of the land”; Clark, above n 21, at 884; see N v R (1999) 16 CRNZ 415 (CA) at [24]. 
30  Police v Casino Bar (No 3) Ltd [2013] NZHC 44, [2013] NZAR 267 at [68]; T v Police HC Wellington 
CRI-2007-485-37, 14 June 2010. 
31  West v Martin [2001] NZAR 49 (CA) at [5] and [13]; New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, s 27(1). 
32  R v Waetford CA406/99, 2 December 1999 at [3]. 
33  R v Dekker CA482/96, 20 February 1997 at 3; for other due process Magna Carta cases see Matahaere v 
New Zealand Police [2012] NZHC 2436; R v D [2003] 1 NZLR 41 (CA); Re Rupa HC Auckland CIV-
2002-404-1191, 8 April 2004. 
34  West v Martin, above n 31, at [18]–[19]; R v Waetford, above n 32, at [5]; R v Dekker, above n 33, at 3. 
35  Independent Fisheries Ltd v Minister for Canterbury Earthquake Recovery [2012] NZHC 1810 at [153]. 
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New Zealand’s law.36  The lack of discussion of Magna Carta may also be due to the 
extensive due process rights laid out in the Bill of Rights Act and other statutes.37  Courts find 
it unnecessary to venture beyond the modern statutory framework back to Magna Carta. 
It is not clear that Magna Carta is a legitimate source for this right.  It does not contain the 
words “due process” and according to Professor Edward Jenks, per legum terrae meant 
something quite different from due process.38  A connection did not emerge until the 
fourteenth century and was affirmed by Coke in the seventeenth century, in what is widely 
considered a distortion.39  Whether Magna Carta is good authority for this right depends on 
whether or not one relies on an incorrect but widespread interpretation or directly on the text.  
This issue will be discussed in a later Part. 
Secondly, the phrase, “lawful judgment of his peers” is thought to give rise to the right to a 
jury trial.  Yet according to the High Court, Magna Carta does not refer to the right to trial by 
jury.40  More recent courts acknowledge the jury’s Magna Carta heritage but still defer to 
contemporary statutory regimes.41  The Court of Appeal has held that “peers” refers to trial 
by one’s social equals not jurors exclusively from the appellant’s community.42  It has also 
restricted the applicability of Magna Carta’s right to jury trials to criminal proceedings.43 
Juries in 1215 were very different from today.  The Court of Appeal has noted that juries in 
1215 were neither impartial nor independent given that “jurors were more akin to witnesses 
than triers of fact”.44  Others say that they were a panel of social equals meeting to settle 
disputes with one another.45  Magna Carta was relied upon in 1302 by a knight who protested 
that his jurors were not knights and therefore not his peers.46  Contemporary parliamentarians 
                                                 
36  At [162]. 
37  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, ss 24, 25, 26 and 27. 
38  Radin, above n 13, at 1060–1061.  This specific phrase is discussed further in Section D of this Part. 
39  Clark, above n 21, at 884; B Abbott Goldberg “‘Interpretation’ of ‘Due Process of Law’ - A Study in 
Irrelevance of Legislative History” (1981) 12 Pac LJ 621 at 627; Ian McDonald “Is Magna Carta More 
Honoured in the Breach?” (2015) 3 BBKLR 173 at 173; see also Jago v District Court (NSW) [1989] HCA 
46, 168 CLR 23 at 67 per Toohey J. 
40  Dreliozis v Wellington District Court [1994] 2 NZLR 198 (HC) at 199–200. 
41  McKee v R [2013] NZCA 387 at [17] and [19]; Ellis v R [2011] NZCA 90 at [15]. 
42  Ellis v R, above n 41, at [34] and [69]. 
43  Gregory v Gollan [2008] NZCA 568, (2008) 19 PRNZ 450 at [23]. 
44  Ellis v R, above n 41, at [34]; Clark, above n 21, at 882. 
45  Turner, above n 7, at 72. 
46  At 109. 
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relied on Magna Carta to ensure they were tried before fellow parliamentarians.47  It is thus 
historically inaccurate to rely on Magna Carta for the right to a jury trial.48 
The Bill of Rights Act gives the right to a jury trial and to a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial court.49  The Juries Act 1981 adds a comprehensive statutory 
framework.  Consequently it is unnecessary to rely on Magna Carta. 
Thirdly, multiple litigants have relied on Magna Carta’s phrase: “we will not deny or defer to 
any man either justice or right”.50  In one such case the Court of Appeal said the potential 
delay would deny access to justice and conflict with the Bill of Rights Act which echoes 
Magna Carta.51  Similar cases likewise confirm Magna Carta’s relationship with the right to 
prompt justice but do so with minimal justification.52  In Unitec Institute of Technology v 
Attorney-General the High Court said that whether Magna Carta provided an independent 
jurisdiction for this right was irrelevant to the outcome.53  However the issue is “of real 
significance” and should be considered more fully in a case where it does affect the 
outcome.54 
Given the Bill of Rights Act’s right against delayed justice, reliance on Magna Carta is 
unnecessary.55  It is also unjustifiable.  In Jago v District Court (NSW) (Jago) the High Court 
of Australia said there is no common law right to a speedy trial derived from Magna Carta.56  
                                                 
47  At 127. 
48  See Clark, above n 21, at 882. 
49  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, ss 24(e) and 25(a). 
50  Magna Carta, c 29; Clark, above n 21, at 880; see Bage Investments Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
(1999) 19 NZTC 15,531 (HC); Mann v Alpine Wear (New Zealand) Ltd [1996] 1 ERNZ 248 (EmpC); 
Nielsen v Body Corporate No 199348 [2010] NZCA 101; R v ETE (1990) 6 CRNZ 176 (HC); R v Harris 
[2008] NZCA 298; Siemer v Fardell HC Auckland CIV-2003-404-5782, 21 June 2010; Wells v Lewis 
(1990) 3 PRNZ 454 (HC). 
51  R v Harris, above n 50, at [43] per Harrison J and [50] per Baragwanath J. 
52  Martin v District Court at Tauranga [1995] 2 NZLR 419 at 429; Ngati Maru Ki Hauraki Inc v Kruithof 
[2005] NZRMA 1 (HC) at [53]; Ngunguru Coastal Investment Ltd v Maori Land Court [2011] NZAR 354 
(HC) at [23]; Nielsen v Body Corporate No 199348, above n 50, at [10]; Rio Beverages Ltd v New Zealand 
Apple & Pear Marketing Board HC Auckland CL81/93, 25 November 1994 at 7; Watson v Clarke [1990] 
1 NZLR 715 (HC) at 722–723; Wells v Lewis, above n 50, at 458. 
53  Unitec Institute of Technology v Attorney-General [2006] 1 NZLR 65 (HC) at [132]. 
54  At [132]. 
55  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, s 25(b). 
56  Jago v District Court (NSW), above n 39, at 34; Clark, above n 21, at 881.  Case law did not support the 
right’s existence and such a right would be inconsistent with the common law rule “that time did not run 
against the king” (Jago v District Court (NSW), above n 39, at 41 and 63-64).  Whilst courts should avoid 
unnecessary delays, the prevention of delay is not an independent legal right (at 42 and 45). 
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This is persuasive authority against reliance on Magna Carta for a right against delayed 
justice.57 
Fourthly, Magna Carta supposedly provides property rights.58  A wide variety of cases 
provide the backdrop for this assertion including bankruptcy,59 public taking of land,60 fishing 
quotas,61 superannuation entitlements,62 unlawful entry into a residence63 and forfeiture of 
goods.64  In fact, the Supreme Court has said that, given property rights’ absence from the 
Bill of Rights Act, the “principal general measure of constitutional protection is under Magna 
Carta”.65  Accordingly, property expropriation must be statutorily authorised.66 
This decision should be read in light of Baragwanath J’s decision in Cooper v Attorney-
General.  Baragwanath J affirmed the constitutional protection of property rights arising from 
Magna Carta.67  He also affirmed parliamentary sovereignty and judges’ inability to 
challenge legislation.68  Thus judicial references to constitutional property rights are not 
suggestions that Parliament’s sovereignty is restricted.  McGechan J also provides useful 
insights.69  He said “disseised of his freehold” refers to land interests and cannot necessarily 
be extended to general property rights.70  He cautioned against relying on Magna Carta’s 
                                                 
57  This is especially so because of the comprehensive historical analysis undertaken by the High Court, 
absent in comparable New Zealand cases.  Although there is no right against delayed justice in Australia’s 
constitution, this does not distinguish the case since in New Zealand Magna Carta is referred to alongside 
the Bill of Rights Act.  Neither the historical analysis of Magna Carta, Coke’s writings, nor the common 
law rule relied upon in Jago v District Court (NSW) are specific to Australia. 
58  Clark, above n 21, at 887. 
59  West v Official Assignee [2007] NZCA 523; West v Martin, above n 31. 
60  Waitakere City Council v Estate Homes Ltd [2006] NZSC 112, [2007] 2 NZLR 149; Riddiford v Attorney-
General [2009] NZCA 603. 
61  Cooper v Attorney-General [1996] 3 NZLR 480 (HC). 
62  Malster v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development [2014] NZHC 1368. 
63  Easton v Governor-General [2012] NZHC 206; see also West v New Zealand Fire Service Commission HC 
Hamilton CIV-2007-419-1531, 16 November 2007. 
64  Mihos v Attorney-General [2008] NZAR 177 (HC) at [23].  
65  Waitakere City Council v Estate Homes Ltd, above n 60, at [45]. 
66  At [45].  These statements are obiter because there had been no taking (at [46] and [54]).  However, the 
Court of Appeal has since relied on this judgment regarding constitutional protection of property rights: 
Riddiford v Attorney-General, above n 60, at [26]. 
67  Cooper v Attorney-General, above n 61, at 483. 
68  At 483–484. 
69  Westco-Lagan Ltd v Attorney-General [2011] 1 NZLR 40 (HC) at [42]. 
70  At [42]. 
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reinterpretations instead of its text.71  It is believed that Coke convinced others that Magna 
Carta secured private property rights.72 
There is no right to private property in the Bill of Rights Act.  Consequently many people use 
this aspect of Magna Carta to justify its retention.73  However there are various statutes and 
common law rules which comprehensively govern property issues rendering Magna Carta 
unnecessary.74 
Fifthly, Magna Carta is famous for “depriving the executive of the power of arbitrary 
taxation”.75  In several cases, courts have rejected extraordinary taxation arguments on the 
basis of parliamentary sovereignty.76  Besides parliamentary sovereignty there are several 
other barriers to deriving tax rights from Magna Carta.  One is that arbitrary taxation is 
prohibited by chapter 12 of Magna Carta which is not included by the ILAA into New 
Zealand law.77  Another is that the representation supposedly required before taxation 
referred to consulting a feudal assembly composed of freemen, not parliamentary consent.78  
This was a very limited representation.  The taxation referred to payments by the king’s 
tenants-in-chief; not by the general population.79  Equating the feudal assembly with 
Parliament is another of Coke’s creative reinterpretations.80  It is a stretch of Magna Carta’s 
text and context to rely on it for such a proposition.  Note that there is no right relating to tax 
in the Bill of Rights Act, instead there is a comprehensive statutory regime. 
Sixthly, Magna Carta prohibited arbitrary detention or punishment except by the lawful 
judgment of peers or by the law of the land.  A number of cases in this category use the 
habeas corpus writ, which is described as the “machinery to deliver on the right conferred by 
the Magna Carta”.81 
                                                 
71  At [42]. 
72  Turner, above n 7, at 148. 
73  See West v Martin, above n 31, at [24]. 
74  Insolvency Act 2006, pt 3; Public Works Act 1981, pt 2; Local Government Act 2002, ss 189 and 190. 
75  Radin, above n 13, at 1072–1073; Turner, above n 7, at 74. 
76  Shaw v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1999] 3 NZLR 154 (CA) at [1], [10] and [14]; Kaihau v Inland 
Revenue Department [1990] 3 NZLR 344 (HC) at 345–346. 
77  See Shaw v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1997] 3 NZLR 611 (HC) at 613–614. 
78  Shaw v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1997], above n 77, at 614; see also Radin, above n 13, at 1072–
1073; Turner, above n 7, at 74. 
79  Turner, above n 7, at 74. 
80  At 148–149. 
81  T v Jones [2007] 2 NZLR 192 (CA) at [59]; see also Kim v Prison Manager, Mount Eden Corrections 
Facility [2012] NZHC 2417, [2012] NZAR 990 at [5]. 
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In one case, a “constitutional principle in favour of preserving liberty” based on Magna Carta 
was used as an interpretative tool by Baragwanath J to support the release of the respondent 
pending his deportation.82  In another the appellant argued for it to be used similarly but it 
was not, since there was no ambiguity in the statute and it was unclear anyway how a strict 
interpretation would enhance liberty.83  Of all the rights claimed to derive from Magna Carta, 
this one is the most validly derived.  Nonetheless there is still some uncertainty.  It is unclear 
how Magna Carta’s specific words: imprisoning, outlawing, exiling, destroying, and 
condemning except by law should be interpreted today.  There have been two cases that each 
raised issues regarding “outlawed” and “exiled” respectively.84  In both cases the appeals 
were dismissed on other grounds so the modern meaning of these words under Magna Carta 
was not discussed.85 
The Bill of Rights Act provides a number of rights relevant to this aspect of Magna Carta.86  
For example, in Young v Attorney-General the appellant alleged a breach of Magna Carta and 
the Bill of Rights Act regarding his revoked bail but conceded that the former statute fell 
within the latter.87  It is unnecessary to rely on Magna Carta. 
Finally, there are some more obscure rights that litigants claim under Magna Carta.  For 
example excessive capitalisation that breaches “ancient freely held custom of spelling his 
name in the ordinary style” or the unconstitutionality of photographic driver licences.88  
These cases usually fail because of parliamentary sovereignty though sometimes judges also 
point out that Magna Carta does not support such rights. 
In summary, for all six of Magna Carta’s well-known rights discussed above there is 
considerable uncertainty regarding both whether Magna Carta is an accurate historical source 
for them and how they should be interpreted today.  All except for property and taxation are 
secured by the Bill of Rights Act.  But all the Magna Carta cases concerning property and 
taxation have been governed by properly enacted, statutory regimes.  Magna Carta is not 
relied on by courts as a basis for any of these rights.  It merely provides a backdrop to claims 
based more securely in the Bill of Rights Act.  There is sufficient statutory protection of 
rights in New Zealand such that Magna Carta is obsolete. 
                                                 
82  Chief Executive of the Department of Labour v Yadegary [2008] NZCA 295, [2009] 2 NZLR 495 at [3] 
and [75]; Immigration Act 1987, s 60. 
83  Bujak v District Court of Christchurch [2009] NZCA 257 at [28]–[29] and [30–[31]. 
84  R v Creser CA38/98, 21 May 1998 at 2; Murphy v Gardiner [1951] NZLR 549 (SC) at 551. 
85  R v Creser, above n 84, at 2–3; Murphy v Gardiner, above n 84, at 553. 
86  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, ss 9, 18 and 22. 
87  Young v Attorney-General [2003] NZAR 627 (HC) at [10] and [44]. 
88  Carter v Police HC Wellington CIV-2005-485-2143, 5 February 2008 at [5]; Wishart v Police HC 
Auckland A185/01, 27 March 2002 at [3]. 
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C Magna Carta as a Symbol 
More abstractly, Magna Carta is said to symbolise both the rule of law and liberty.89  The rule 
of law requires that “all power [comes] from the law and that no man, be he king or minister 
or private person, is above the law”.90  The barons forced King John to follow England’s laws 
in an attempt to end the arbitrary arrests and property confiscations that had characterised his 
reign.  Magna Carta did not proclaim rule of law in as many words; rather each clause 
restricted an aspect of King John’s power.91  Nonetheless its connection with the rule of law 
has been affirmed many times including by numerous prominent members of the New 
Zealand legal profession.92  Furthermore, in Unitec Institute of Technology v Attorney-
General the High Court referred to Magna Carta as of “enduring symbolic value” due to 
being a foundation for the rule of law.93  Some cases also refer to the rule of law as being 
given effect to through the substantive rights discussed above.94 
Magna Carta also speaks to people’s liberty.95  This is a liberty under law; to have a law to 
live by, not liberty to act however one wants.96  For example, in Chief Executive of the 
Department of Labour v Yadegary the Court of Appeal said that Magna Carta was the source 
of a “constitutional principle in favour of preserving liberty” given effect through a common 
law presumption in favour of liberty.97  This liberty is increasingly expressed through human 
rights.98  Over time it was realised that liberty required popular participation in law-making 
and so Magna Carta became linked to democracy too.99   
Magna Carta’s liberal use as an original authority for these values is unjustified.  Lord 
Sumption labelled this attribution a “distortion of history to serve an essentially modern 
political agenda” or a “lawyer’s view”.100  Neither of the above principles originated in 
                                                 
89  Geoffrey Palmer and others “What does Magna Carta mean in 21st century New Zealand?” (2015) 867 
Law Talk 6 at 15. 
90  Jennings, above n 6, at 9. 
91  Lord Neuberger, President of the United Kingdom Supreme Court “Magna Carta: The Bible of the English 
Constitution or a disgrace to the English nation?” (Speech at Guildford Cathedral, 18 June 2015) at [42]. 
92  Palmer and others, above n 89, at 8, 10 and 11. 
93  Unitec Institute of Technology v Attorney-General, above n 53, at [131]. 
94  In Ngunguru Coastal Investment Ltd v Maori Land Court, above n 52, at [23], the High Court said that 
delayed justice “erodes the rule of law”. 
95  Jennings, above n 6, at 15; Clark, above n 21, at 890. 
96  Jennings, above n 6, at 21. 
97  Chief Executive of the Department of Labour v Yadegary, above n 82, at [75]. 
98  Clark, above n 21, at 889–890. 
99  Turner, above n 7, at 4 and 5. 
100  Lord Sumption, Justice of the United Kingdom Supreme Court “Magna Carta then and now” (Address to 
the Friends of the British Library, 9 March 2015) at 1 and 4. 
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Magna Carta.101  It was not the beginning of the rule of law; that concept had existed in 
England long before 1215, nor was it defined until Dicey.102  Likewise habeas corpus, 
liberty’s remedy, existed irrespective of Magna Carta but was not confirmed in statute until 
1640.103  The liberty supposedly rooted in Magna Carta is argued by Jenks to not mean 
liberty for the whole population.104  Rather it meant the barons’ liberty from King John’s 
control accompanied by their own ability to oppress those beneath them.105  Again Coke’s 
interpretative influence is at play; he interpreted “liberties” which referred to privileges and 
immunities as meaning the personal liberty of the king’s subjects.106  Ivor Jennings has 
suggested that where a state has a bill of rights protecting personal liberty, “the fact that one 
or two provisions derive from Magna Carta is interesting but irrelevant”.107 
One should think twice then about giving Magna Carta so much credit.  Magna Carta’s effect 
in 1215 may resemble what would now be called the rule of law in action.  This does not 
render Magna Carta the source of or best authority for the rule of law.  That is a Whiggish 
distortion of history which should be carefully avoided.108  Such interpretations view history 
as a deliberate marching towards present ideals whether or not that was the direction 
historical actors were facing.109  It is unlikely that historians and lawyers will ever agree on 
whether Magna Carta truly propagates the values it is claimed to.  However, there is 
sufficient uncertainty to cast doubt on the unequivocal glorification of Magna Carta. 
D Overarching Themes 
So far some specific uses of Magna Carta have been discussed.  This Section looks at more 
overarching usage patterns. Magna Carta is regularly used to challenge parliamentary 
sovereignty and is often misquoted.  Effective legal systems should strive to minimise this 
sort of misuse of legislation by removing or repairing the statutes responsible. 
                                                 
101  At 6 and 10; see Jennings, above n 6, at 13. 
102  Sumption, above n 100, at 4 and 6; Jennings, above n 6, at 13; Philip A Joseph Constitutional and 
Administrative Law in New Zealand (3rd ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2007) at [6.1]. 
103  Clark, above n 21, at 885. 
104  Radin, above n 13, at 1061. 
105  At 1061. 
106   Sumption, above n 100, at 15. 
107  Jennings, above n 6, at 42. 
108  Sumption, above n 100, at 4. 
109  Turner, above n 7, at 6–7. 
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1 Challenging parliamentary sovereignty 
Roughly a third of litigants referring to Magna Carta directly challenge parliamentary 
sovereignty.  Its “fundamental constitutional character” supposedly renders conflicting 
legislation invalid and allows courts to “overrule, repeal, revoke, amend or not apply 
provisions” contravening Magna Carta.110  These claims inevitably fail; the phrase “unless by 
the law of the land” allows the government plenty of room to act.  Courts have consistently 
affirmed parliamentary sovereignty and denied their ability to overrule or disregard 
legislation.111  Magna Carta is not “supreme law in the sense of a limit on the New Zealand 
Parliament’s sovereignty”.112  The Bill of Rights Act does not provide for judicial challenge 
of legislation.113  Given its proximity to the ILAA, it is unlikely that Parliament intended 
courts to be able to strike down legislation that contradicts Magna Carta.114 
Many cases challenge a specific statute, however in some cases Magna Carta is used to 
challenge sovereignty more generally.  For instance, one appellant argued he was neither 
under the Queen’s sovereignty, the New Zealand government’s jurisdiction nor subject to 
legislation.115  This litigation pattern reveals a fundamental misunderstanding about Magna 
Carta’s role and Parliament’s supremacy.  Magna Carta forbids certain actions unless 
authorised by Parliament; it restrains executive power.116  In 18th century England, as power 
shifted from the monarchy to Parliament an expectation grew that just as Magna Carta had 
                                                 
110  Clark, above n 21, at 875–876; McKee v R, above n 41, at [14].  Legislation challenged by litigants 
includes Customs and Excise Act 1996 (Mihos v Attorney-General, above n 64, at [23]); Dog Control Act 
1996 (Middleton v Timaru District Court [2012] NZHC 3471 at [3]); Fisheries Amendment Act (No 3) 
1992 (Cooper v Attorney-General, above n 61, at 483); Income Tax Act 1976 (Shaw v Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue [1999], above n 76, at [1]; Kaihau v Inland Revenue Department, above n 76); Land 
Transport Act 1998 (Wishart v Police, above n 88, at [1]); Misuse of Drugs Act 1975 (R v Creser, above n 
84, at 1; R v Knowles CA146/98, 12 October 1998 at 1; Phillips v R [2011] NZCA 225 at [1]; Bouavong v 
R HC Auckland CRI-2011-404-47, 4 April 2011 at [1]; McKee v R, above n 41; Van Resseghem v Police 
CA98/86, 17 June 1986); Social Security Act 1964 (Malster v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social 
Development, above n 62, at [13]). 
111  Constitution Act 1986, s 15.  Cases relying on Shaw v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1999], above n 
76, include: Matahaere v New Zealand Police, above n 33, at [15]; West v Martin, above n 31, at [26]; 
West v New Zealand Fire Service Commission, above n 63, at [26]; Westco-Lagan Ltd v Attorney-General, 
above n 69, at [41]. 
112  Shaw v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1999], above n 76, at [14]. 
113  At [14]. 
114  At [14]. 
115  Matahaere v New Zealand Police, above n 33, at [3] and [15].  Another group submitted they held 
prerogative power as tangata whenua and were neither subject to statutes enacted by Parliament nor the 
District Court’s jurisdiction (Phillips v R, above n 110, at [7]).  Still another presented a document entitled 
“Declaration of the Independence of Te Hapu One One Society” which was used in conjunction with 
Magna Carta to challenge the High Court’s jurisdiction (Bouavong v R, above n 110, at [3], [4] and [7]). 
116  William Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford, 1765–1769) vol 1 at 137 as cited in 
Murphy v Gardiner, above n 84, at 553. 
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limited the monarchy’s authority, perhaps it could limit Parliament’s untrammelled power.117  
Yet, Parliament, in its sovereignty, disregarded and repealed most of the Charter.118  Many 
litigants today, in their reliance on Magna Carta, are claiming their sphere of liberty against 
the government as the rule of law entitles them to do.119  The problem is it is often Parliament 
who they feel has encroached upon that sphere and Magna Carta is no good against the might 
of Parliament’s sovereignty. 
There is harm in this.  Magna Carta is a statute supposedly symbolising the rule of law but 
which ordinary New Zealanders consistently misunderstand.  Already disenfranchised 
citizens use it, expecting protection against what they perceive as unjust use of state power, 
only to be disappointed.  This propensity to be misunderstood creates false hope.  For the rule 
of law to pervade society, ordinary people must trust the law to rule them.120  People do not 
trust a law that creates false hope then disappoints.  Though this false hope is a 
misinterpretation, it speaks to Magna Carta’s lack of clarity, something that also breaches the 
rule of law.  This confusion may be partly due to Magna Carta being listed as a constitutional 
enactment and to general, widespread ignorance about New Zealand’s constitution.121  Its 
continuance as a statute despite being essentially unenforceable may also contribute. 
2 Misused phrases 
Many phrases in Magna Carta are ambiguous.  In fact, it never had any precise meaning.122  
This is in large part due to difficulties in translating the original Latin text into English.123  
Consequently modern applications of Magna Carta are disjointed from the meanings of the 
text within its original context.  Magna Carta is regularly misquoted by New Zealand courts.  
Words used interchangeably include “disseised” and “dispossessed”,124 “freehold or liberties 
                                                 
117  Turner, above n 7, at 5. 
118  At 5. 
119  Joseph, above n 102, at [6.1]. 
120  Brian Tamanaha “A Concise Guide to the Rule of Law” in Gianluigi Palombella and Neil Walker (eds) 
Relocating the Rule of Law (Hart Publishing, United States of America, 2009) 3 at 11. 
121  Imperial Laws Application Act, sch 1; see Shaw v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1999], above n 76, at 
[14].  The recent Constitutional Conversation highlighted the lack of knowledge and education about how 
New Zealand’s constitutional framework works. For instance many people were unaware that Parliament 
can legislate inconsistently with the Bill of Rights Act and the Treaty of Waitangi (Constitutional Advisory 
Panel New Zealand Constitution: A Report on a Conversation (November 2013) at 13). 
122  Holt Magna Carta, above n 4, at 6. 
123  Turner, above n 7, at 72. 
124  T v Jones, above n 81, at [59]; Gregory v Gollan, above n 43, at [8]; Westco-Lagan Ltd v Attorney-
General, above n 69, at [34]; Riddiford v Attorney-General [2009], above n 60, at [26]; Waitakere City 
Council v Estate Homes Ltd, above n 60, at [45]. 
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or free customs” and “tennement”,125 and “but by the law of the land”, “except by” and “save 
by”.126  Whilst these alternatives are largely synonymous, courts use these in direct statutory 
quotations.  They should not have to undertake any interpretation from Latin, because there is 
a traditionally accepted translation used both in the United Kingdom and in New Zealand.127  
Such misquoting is thus bad practice and indicative of uncertainty surrounding Magna 
Carta’s text as well as its meaning. 
There is also uncertainty regarding the meaning of some of the phrases in Magna Carta which 
inform the whole chapter.  Whilst “by the law of the land” is often read to mean due process, 
several New Zealand cases read it as according to statute made by Parliament.128  Whether 
reliance on a statutory framework indeed falls within either due process or “law of the land” 
is unclear.  “[L]aw of the land” was never a precise term.129  For instance there is some 
historical uncertainty as to whether it is equivalent to “lawful judgments of his peers” or 
refers to a distinct procedure.130  King John and the barons likely had divergent 
understandings of it.131  Both Sir Thomas Littleton and Coke interpreted “law of the land” to 
mean common law procedures.132  Magna Carta was after all said to be declaratory of 
existing fundamental laws in England.133  It is thus unclear whether “law of the land” can be 
automatically used as a reference to statutory frameworks. 
There is similar uncertainty regarding “freemen”.  Magna Carta’s reference to “freemen” did 
not include all the population.134  In 1215 “freemen” meant knights as well as some smaller 
landholders.135  It excluded unfree peasants and serfs.136  Five rights were given to five-sixths 
of the population and twenty-seven rights to the remaining wealthy, ruling, “free” 
                                                 
125  Gregory v Gollan, above n 43, at [8]; Westco-Lagan Ltd v Attorney-General, above n 69, at [34]; 
Robertson v Auckland Council [2014] NZHC 765 at [32]; Cooper v Attorney-General, above n 61, at 483; 
Russell v Minister of Lands (1898) 17 NZLR 241 (SC) at 250. 
126  Note that the first phrase of each set is the correct one.  Gregory v Gollan, above n 43, at [8]; Westco-
Lagan Ltd v Attorney-General, above n 69, at [34]; Russell v Minister of Lands, above n 125, at 250; T v 
Jones, above n 81, at [59]; Kim v Prison Manager, Mount Eden Corrections Facility, above n 81, at [5]. 
127  “Magna Carta 1297” Legislation.gov.uk <www.legislation.gov.uk> at comment X1. 
128  Cooper v Attorney-General, above n 61, at 483; Shaw v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1999], above n 
76, at [18]; Waitakere City Council v Estate Homes Ltd, above n 60, at [45]; see also Riddiford v Attorney-
General [2009], above n 60, at [26]; Murphy v Gardiner, above n 84, at 553. 
129  Turner, above n 7, at 72. 
130  At 72. 
131  At 72. 
132  At 131 and 148–149. 
133  Gough, above n 12, at 40. 
134  Turner, above n 7, at 71. 
135  At 71. 
136  At 71. 
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minority.137  The rights that did apply generally were of no use to the peasantry.138  So Magna 
Carta’s restraining of the king exclusively benefitted the wealthy upper class.  This is at odds 
with public sentiments that Magna Carta is the foundation of democracy, ensuring nobody is 
above the law.139  Rather, it emphasised class distinctions and selectively, rather than 
universally, distributed rights.  However, Magna Carta’s rights were broader than those of 
contemporary, comparable, continental charters.140  Though meagre in hindsight, perhaps 
Magna Carta was a decent attempt, for its time, to secure rights for everyone against the 
monarchy.141  The Bill of Rights Act requires legislation to be interpreted consistently with 
human rights, suggesting perhaps courts should give “freemen” a broad meaning.142  
Nonetheless, it is uncertain whether Magna Carta was intended to stand for a principle of 
equality before the law as is so often claimed. 
E Summary 
This Part has shown that Magna Carta is unclear, uncertain, misused and thus obsolete.  As 
law, it no longer contributes anything unique to the law.  Its frequent misinterpretation 
renders it impossible to have any certainty regarding its true meaning.  As principle, it is not a 
basis for what it is claimed to be.  Nor, as will be further discussed later in the paper, do those 
principles depend on Magna Carta in order to be influential.  Magna Carta falls well short of 
expectations and in fact breeds distrust in and misunderstanding of New Zealand’s 
constitutional structure.  If there were no alternative, perhaps reliance on Magna Carta might 
be justified despite all these flaws.  However given that there are alternatives such as the Bill 
of Rights Act, continued reliance on Magna Carta is unnecessary and it should be replaced.  
These conclusions of this section are used to support the arguments made in the remainder of 
the paper. 
III Magna Carta: Interpretation 
The previous section looked at how Magna Carta is interpreted.  It is interpreted to have a 
very broad and symbolic meaning.  This is the myth of Magna Carta and where its value 
supposedly lies.  This section looks at whether this is a reasonable way to interpret Magna 
Carta.  It concludes that there is no acceptable or appropriate legal interpretation method 
which when applied to Magna Carta can produce that myth.  The first possible method is to 
                                                 
137  E Jenks “The Myth of Magna Carta” in JC Holt (ed) Magna Carta and the Idea of Liberty (John Wiley and 
Sons, United States of America, 1972) 25 at 31–32. 
138  At 31. 
139  “The Magna Carta Timeline” (2015) Magna Carta 800th <magnacarta800th.com>. 
140  Turner, above n 7, at 71. 
141  W Stubbs Constitutional History of England (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1897) vol 1 at 579 as cited in Holt 
Magna Carta, above n 4, at 267. 
142  Rozenberg, above n 27. 
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treat Magna Carta as if it were an ordinary statute.  But the myth cannot be obtained through 
this method.  An alternative method is to acknowledge Magna Carta’s constitutionality and 
interpret it accordingly.  Two examples of constitutional interpretation methods are the 
approaches applied to the Bill of Rights Act and the Treaty of Waitangi.  However these 
approaches are either insufficient or inappropriate.  Since there is no valid method of 
obtaining the myth, the myth cannot be supported.  Without that myth, Magna Carta’s 
continued statutory existence is both unnecessary and unhelpful. 
A Interpreting Magna Carta as an Ordinary Statute 
The popular interpretations and applications of Magna Carta are disconnected from its text.  
This goes against the mandated approach to statutory interpretation by which a statute’s 
ordinary meaning should “be ascertained from its text and in the light of its purpose”.143  
Adherence to Magna Carta’s text is not advocated for here out of excessive reverence for the 
past or a belief that the barons were better law-makers than current parliamentarians and 
judges.144  Rather fidelity to Magna Carta’s text and its framers’ intentions is here motivated 
by its statutory nature.  Adherence to the text better upholds the intent of the accepted 
legislator, Parliament.145  Hence the text should have priority over more extensive judicial 
discretion.146  As well as deferring to Parliament, this also enhances the ordinary person’s 
capacity to determine how they should act from reading the statute.147 
Significant uncertainty regarding Magna Carta’s ordinary meaning makes it difficult to find 
and follow that meaning.  It requires in-depth analysis to identify what is historical distortion 
whilst acknowledging that Magna Carta was itself a distortion.148  But it seems interpreters 
have willingly strayed from Magna Carta’s text.  McGechan J, in Westco-Lagan v Attorney-
General, was concerned about the “danger of treating as real what it is thought to have said, 
rather than concentrating upon its actual provisions”.149  Magna Carta’s distorted 
misinterpretations, such as the claimed due process and property rights, have widespread 
support and their own considerable history.  Yet, interpretation must look at the text and 
purpose, not at myth. 
                                                 
143  Interpretation Act 1999, s 5(1). 
144  Richard A Posner “Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and Critique of History in Adjudication and Legal 
Scholarship” (2006) 67 U Chi L Rev 573 at 591. 
145  Francis Bennion Bennion on Statutory Interpretation (5th ed, LexisNexis, London, 2008) at 193 and 441; 
see Posner, above n 144, at 591. 
146  See Posner, above n 144, at 591; Matthew J Festa “Applying a Useable Past: The Use of History in Law” 
(2008) 38 Seton Hall L Rev 479 at 489. 
147  Bennion, above n 145, at 803; see generally John F Burrows “Statutes and the Ordinary Person” (2002) 11 
Waikato L Rev 1 at 5. 
148  Holt Magna Carta, above n 4, at 21. 
149  Westco-Lagan v Attorney-General, above n 69, at [42]. 
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At the same time legislation must be “flexible enough to properly address foreseeable 
developments in technology or society generally”.150  It is often argued that if Magna Carta is 
interpreted in the light of subsequent legal developments then it can be given a much broader 
meaning, irrespective of its text.151  An updating construction acknowledges that statutes are 
always speaking and allows for words to gradually gain different meanings.152  However 
modern issues are “very remote from the concerns of those who prepared” Magna Carta “and 
from its meaning and purpose in its historical context”.153  One cannot merely assume Magna 
Carta’s modern relevance; its language should be evaluated to determine modern 
usefulness.154  “[L]aw of the land” may now mean something wider than the “good, old law” 
and “all freemen” may now include everyone when given a human rights friendly 
interpretation. 
Nonetheless a distinction should be made between flexibility and ambiguity.155  Any updating 
must be limited by the statute’s text and purpose.156  In McVeagh v Attorney-General 
O’Regan J warned that too extensive an updating of the Habeas Corpus Act 1640 “would 
require the reading into the section of words which are plainly not there, and an interpretation 
which is plainly inconsistent with the statutory scheme” of the Act.157  It would be 
inconsistent for the courts to read in words plainly absent from Magna Carta after having 
refused to do exactly that with regard to an analogous ancient statute.  Updating constructions 
are generally used in situations such as including computer programs within “documents” and 
same-sex relationships within “family”.158  Yet here it is the whole of Magna Carta which 
                                                 
150  Legislation Advisory Committee Guidelines on Process and Content of Legislation (October 2014) at 47; 
see Interpretation Act, s 6. 
151  For example West v Official Assignee, above n 59, at [39]; Gregory v Gollan, above n 43, at [23].  This 
was argued with respect to the Habeas Corpus Act 1640 in McVeagh v Attorney-General (HC), above n 23, 
at [18] and [26].  In this case the appellant sought damages under the Habeas Corpus Act 1640 (at [2]).  It 
still applied because of the timing of the writ application even though it had been replaced with the Habeas 
Corpus Act 2001 (at [9]).  Whilst the specific reasons for the outcome in this case are not relevant here, the 
general reasoning of both the High Court and the Court of Appeal is a good example of how advantageous 
it can be to replace ancient documents with modern alternatives and is useful for rebutting arguments often 
made in support of Magna Carta. 
152  Bennion, above n 145, at 702; Cathy Nijman “Ascertaining the Meaning of Legislation - A Question of 
Context” (2007) 38 VUWLR 629 at 645. 
153  McVeagh v Attorney-General [2002] 1 NZLR 808 (CA) at [22]. 
154  Westco-Lagan v Attorney-General, above n 69 at [42]. 
155  See Lon L Fuller The Morality of Law (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1969) at 64. 
156  Nijman, above n 152, at 646; Susan Glazebrook “Filling the Gaps” (Speech in Auckland, May 2003) at 18. 
157  McVeagh v Attorney-General (HC), above n 23, at [26] and [30].  The arguments relating to the Habeas 
Corpus Act 1640 can be transferred to Magna Carta.  Both documents evolved from historic contexts far 
removed from present-day New Zealand but are similarly included in New Zealand law and concern 
fundamental rights.  Habeas corpus is the remedy to Magna Carta’s right to not be arbitrarily detained or 
punished except in accordance with the law (see Joseph, above n 102, at [26.2.4]; T v Jones, above n 81, at 
[59]). 
158  Nijman, above n 152, at 645; see Glazebrook, above n 156, at 18. 
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needs adjusting to modern circumstances.  Such a complete update should not be done under 
the guise of interpretation.159  There is no rational basis for such an interpretation. 
On the other hand, legislation’s text must be interpreted in light of its purpose.  Too literal an 
approach to interpreting Magna Carta could restrict the baron’s reform ambitions as well as 
the very general principles Magna Carta has come to stand for.  One must look at the “social, 
economic or other end[s]”160 Magna Carta’s framers hoped to achieve whilst still focussing 
on the statute’s purpose not “the underlying subjective intentions of the framers”.161  Yet the 
idea that there is always a clear, identifiable purpose is a legal fiction.162  Magna Carta does 
not have a purpose provision like modern statutes.  King John and the barons were not 
necessarily “reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably”.163  Finding the 
purpose is especially difficult here because Magna Carta was not drafted by one unified body 
such as the Queen in Parliament or, as in medieval times, solely by the monarch.164  It has 
been suggested that Magna Carta was drafted by several people and represented a 
compromise between two parties at conflict.165 
It helps to ask what necessitated the creation of this document.  Magna Carta was a set of 
specific remedies against the King, in very particular circumstances.166  It was also an attempt 
to permanently reform both the King’s relationship with the barons and the general 
governance structure.167  The barons aimed to restrict the King’s power whereas the King 
aimed to control the rebellion.168  From this arises the idea that Magna Carta stands for the 
rule of law.  However, merely appearing to modern eyes to represent the rule of law is 
insufficient.  Cathy Nijman says:169 
The purposive approach … cannot be used to change the plain meaning of words 
used.  A judge cannot use the purposive approach to justify rewriting a statute as 
she or he would have written it, nor does it justify attributing a meaning to words 
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arrived at by working backward from an assumed purpose, nor, it is submitted, a 
meaning arrived at by working backward from a perceived desirable result. 
Attributing the rule of law to Magna Carta and extending it to a vast array of modern 
circumstances is doing exactly that - working backwards from a perceived desirable result.  
The purpose behind Magna Carta’s creation was not to establish the rule of law.  As 
discussed in Part II, its purpose was to avert war and protect the interests of the framers, not 
the wider population. 
This begs the question: how malleable should the law be in the hands of its interpreters?170  
Manipulating legal texts to advance the rights and principles currently prevalent in society is 
symptomatic of an extremely instrumentalist view of the law.171  Non-instrumentalism or 
formalism pays greater deference to the binding nature of legal rules.172  Brian Tamanaha 
says that:173 
If achieving a purpose or end is allowed to prevail over a rule, the rule is relegated 
to a “mere rule of thumb, defeasible when the purposes behind the rule would not 
be served.”  A rule of thumb is not a binding rule. 
Whilst some balance between purposes and binding rules is needed, the predominant 
approach to interpreting Magna Carta strays too far into a purely instrumentalist view of the 
law.  That is inconsistent with the rule of law which requires rules to be fixed beforehand so 
that the government’s response to its citizens’ behaviour is entirely predictable.174 
Aside from any of its more elaborate meanings, the principle of the rule of law stands for 
exactly that - the rule of law, not of any man or woman.  Geoffrey Palmer recently remarked 
that “[t]he details are perhaps less important than the symbol Magna Carta later became in the 
hands of lawyers like Sir Edward Coke and Sir William Blackstone.”175  But it is the very 
antithesis of the rule of law that it is the interpreter that matters, not the rule.  Aristotle 
himself said that “the rule of law is preferable to that of any individual”.176  Citizens cannot 
plan their behaviour on the basis of a rule that’s meaning is more than the sum of its parts.177  
It becomes impossible for a citizen to read a statute and understand from it his or her rights 
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and obligations.178  Moreover when an Act’s meaning is detached from the original intentions 
of its legislative drafters, this impacts parliamentary sovereignty.179  Statutory interpretation 
must be done with a full understanding that the statute “is an expression of the will of the 
accepted legislator”; interpretation must always seek to convey legislative intention.180 
Reinterpreting Magna Carta to resolve ambiguities, making it applicable to modern 
circumstances and applying its purpose can only go so far.  Arbitrarily misquoting it crosses 
that line, as does knowingly relying on erroneous interpretations for instance regarding due 
process or arbitrary taxation.  So long as Magna Carta remains a statute it must be interpreted 
accurately and lawfully.  If such an interpretation is undesirable, the response should not be 
to forsake legally accepted approaches to legislation, but rather to repeal it.  Magna Carta is 
so entirely ambiguous, out of date and disconnected with modern conceptions of rights and 
constitutional principles that creative interpretations cannot restore it.  It would be more 
effective, efficient and conducive to certainty to replace it. 
An updating construction and purposive approach might give Magna Carta a wider meaning 
than its text.  But the need to start with and remain faithful to the text restricts this approach.  
Consequently it is not possible, using ordinary statutory interpretation techniques, to derive 
from Magna Carta the broad rights and principles usually attributed to it.  Magna Carta is an 
ancient historical document that would require almost universal updating along with 
comprehensive gap-filling. 
B Interpreting Magna Carta as a Constitutional Statute 
Magna Carta is no ordinary statute.  It is a constitutional statute concerning human rights and 
liberties.  Thus, interpreting it as a mere ordinary statute is not the only - or best - 
approach.181  This section looks at how interpretation methods used for constitutional statutes 
could be applied to Magna Carta and the suitability of doing that.  Specifically it looks at the 
Bill of Rights Act and the Treaty of Waitangi. 
When interpreting Magna Carta as an ordinary statute, care had to be taken to not work 
backwards to giving it a rule of law purpose it did not in fact have.  In contrast, applying the 
interpretative techniques used for the Bill of Rights Act would allow more reliance on such a 
purpose and would be less constrained by the specific wording.  The focus should be on the 
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objective of the provision, not the objective of the framers.182  Language, other provisions 
and the historical, social and legal context all help determine purpose.183 
Constitutional rights should be given a generous interpretation.184  Still, “generosity is 
subordinate to purpose, [and] is no excuse for overshooting the target”.185  In S v Zuma the 
South African Constitutional Court said that “the Constitution does not mean whatever we 
might wish it to mean”.186  The Court went on to say that “[i]f the language used by the 
lawgiver is ignored in favour of a general resort to “values” the result is not interpretation but 
divination.”187  The Privy Council, making use of S v Zuma, has similarly said that:188 
It is however a mistake to suppose that these considerations release judges from the 
task of interpreting the statutory language and enable them to give free rein to 
whatever they consider should have been the moral and political views of the 
framers of the constitution. 
The interpretation of ordinary statutes and constitutional statutes has a common 
concern with “the meaning of the language which has been used”.189 
Given that there was obviously no Parliament in 1215 we must look at the intentions of both 
the barons and the King which have already been established as conflicting and narrow.  This 
approach places more emphasis on Magna Carta’s purpose and less on its text.  The barons’ 
overall intention to restrain the King within the law matters more than the specific third 
century remedies they extracted.  The generosity due constitutional statutes means that more 
technical issues such as those raised above regarding “freemen” and “law of the land” should 
not overcome the general rights protection represented by Magna Carta.  Magna Carta’s 
rights should have a generous scope. 
Generosity towards Magna Carta can only go so far.  The extreme specificity of Magna 
Carta’s other provisions and their connectedness to their era impairs chapter 29’s 
timelessness.  Similarly, the historical, social and legal context goes against the idea that the 
barons intended to create a document that would found all democracies or invent the rule of 
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law.  They were largely self-interested, backward-looking elitists who wanted to govern their 
own land safe from the King’s whims.  Furthermore, whilst some historians say it was more 
generous than its continental counterparts,190 others question why Magna Carta became so 
significant given its similarity to contemporary documents.191  These factors restrict the 
purpose from being given too generous an interpretation. 
After all, though constitutional, Magna Carta is ultimately still a legal instrument, the 
language of which must be respected.  Ignoring its text in favour of symbolic values is 
divination not interpretation.  Yet it is these values that underlie most arguments for retaining 
Magna Carta.  It is telling that recently the New Zealand Parliament described Magna Carta’s 
value as “the vibe of the thing”,192 a quote usually derided as the antithesis of good legal 
reasoning.  Deriving the rule of law from Magna Carta is not a purposive and generous 
interpretation of a justiciable right.  It is the divination of a value and a disregarding of 
statutory language. 
The purposive interpretation techniques used for the Bill of Rights Act come closer to 
reaching the myths Magna Carta stands for than treating it as an ordinary statute.  However, 
the factors used to determine purpose and caution against divining values are still too 
restrictive to justify the broad, myth-based approach to Magna Carta. 
The interpretation techniques used for the Treaty are another alternative.  Both are significant 
documents in New Zealand’s constitutional framework and both are historical documents 
whose historical context is pivotal to their interpretation.193  Additionally, both documents are 
subject to ongoing disagreements regarding their textual ambiguity caused by multiple 
translations, uncertain intentions and subsequent misinterpretations.194 
Similar to the Bill of Rights Act, when interpreting the Treaty of Waitangi, courts use a 
purposive approach without “the austerity of tabulated legalism”.195  Matthew Palmer says of 
the Treaty, that:196 
Its history, its form and its place in our social order clearly require a broad 
interpretation and one which recognises that the Treaty must be capable of 
adaptation to new and changing circumstances as they arise. 
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There is significant dispute as to whether the Māori or English Treaty text is authoritative.  
Yet an “unquibbling” approach sets aside textual differences and invokes the Treaty’s 
underlying principles.197  Palmer summarises as follows:198 
The “principles” are the underlying mutual obligations and responsibilities which 
the Treaty places on the parties.  They reflect the intent of the Treaty as a whole 
and include, but are not confined to, the express terms of the Treaty.  With the 
passage of time, the “principles” which underlie the Treaty have become much 
more important than its precise terms. 
This approach aligns with most lawyers’ approach to Magna Carta.  Uncertainty over the 
precise meaning of Magna Carta’s words should not restrict the modern application of its 
underlying principles.  The principles are clear - the citizens will not rebel and the executive 
will act within the boundaries of the law.  Thus the rule of law is not restricted by whether or 
not “law of the land” equates to due process.  Over 800 years it has become much more 
important than the specific remedies and rights Magna Carta granted to the barons of 1215.  
Using a principles approach to interpret Magna Carta could therefore support the myths it is 
argued to stand for. 
There are some distinctions between the Treaty and Magna Carta that may reduce the 
suitability of this approach.  The Treaty is far less specific than Magna Carta which makes its 
relevance more perpetual.  Additionally, it may well be valid to take a generous, principles 
approach to the interpretation of an international treaty informing the constitution.  But it 
does not necessarily follow that such an interpretation is valid for a constitutional statute.  A 
more significant issue arises from criticisms of the principles approach.  It is not necessarily 
an ideal method for interpreting the Treaty.  The approach disregards the Māori text and its 
meaning.199  The differences in the words and the spirit of the two texts are trivialised by 
reducing the Treaty to a mere source of principles rather than an authoritative treaty that 
defines the division of power in New Zealand.200  It removes it from its historical context and 
its culture so that it can apply to modern situations without challenging the Crown’s 
sovereignty.  But as a historical document intersecting two cultures, it cannot be so removed 
without undermining its integrity. 
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This lessens the appeal of this approach.  Applying a statute’s principles rather than its text in 
order to avoid realities that grate with current ideals is a dangerous way to approach statutory 
interpretation.  It puts too much power in judges’ hands to find desirable principles from 
unwelcome provisions.  It also reduces the authority of the principles claimed.  Are the 
Treaty’s principles those enunciated by a Westminster style court 147 years after it was 
signed or are they the understandings of the Māori chiefs and people in 1840?  To rely on a 
later interpretation, that potentially denies the realities of Magna Carta’s historical origins 
does injustice to its framers’ intentions. 
The above limitations of these constitutional interpretation approaches impair their suitability 
as techniques for interpreting Magna Carta.  If the realities of Magna Carta’s text are 
undesirable then it should be repealed.  If there is unwillingness to repeal it, then it should be 
applied true to its text.  This, combined with the distinctions between Magna Carta and the 
Treaty, makes the principles approach inappropriate for interpreting Magna Carta. 
C Summary 
The common approach to Magna Carta takes its text, applies some process and ends up with 
a myth of constitutional principles.  Neither of the approaches used for ordinary statutes nor 
the Bill of Rights Act allow for sufficient abstractness to reach that mythical result.  The 
Treaty’s principles approach could achieve such an outcome.  However, limitations in that 
process and distinctions between the two documents render that approach unsuitable.  There 
is thus no valid, already accepted method by which Magna Carta could be interpreted to give 
it the mythical value it is claimed to have.  Magna Carta’s value is based on an interpretation 
that cannot be justified by accepted interpretation methods.  Therefore keeping it on the basis 
of that value is unreasonable.  Magna Carta should be replaced. 
IV Magna Carta: A Broken Emblem 
This part questions whether the emblem of the rule of law complies with the rule of law.  
Aspects of this have already arisen in this paper.  For instance Part III discussed the reliance 
on the discretion of interpreters from Coke through to the modern judiciary, as opposed to the 
text of Magna Carta which goes against its certainty as a rule of law.  Also Part II’s 
discussion of how Magna Carta is used to challenge parliamentary sovereignty raised the 
issue of distrust in the law arising from disappointed expectations.  Other aspects of the rule 
of law are addressed here.  The rule of law requires that all law be clear, accessible and apply 
equally.201  However, disagreement over its precise boundaries means there are numerous 
frameworks that could be used to evaluate Magna Carta.  A mixture of theoretical models and 
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practical frameworks underlie the following evaluation of Magna Carta’s rule of law 
compliance.202 
A Content of the Law 
The law should be necessary.  Laws exist to effect change in society;203 if they no longer have 
any effect, then their raison d’être has waned.  Statutory “dead wood” should be cleared away 
or at the very least modernised even if it is historically significant.204  It brings the law into 
disrepute as well as wasting time and money to retain legislation that has no legal effect and 
is unenforceable.205  The question then, is does Magna Carta cause change in modern New 
Zealand society or is it merely dead wood? 
Part II established that Magna Carta is obsolete in New Zealand.  This conclusion was not 
merely based on infrequent use but because Magna Carta has no discernible practical use.206  
While it is still referred to by litigants, it has had minimal impact on litigation.207  There is no 
right in Magna Carta that is not sufficiently protected elsewhere.208  The deliberate decision 
by Parliament to exclude certain rights from the Bill of Rights Act should not be undermined 
by relying on Magna Carta instead.  It has been duplicated, to the extent desired by modern 
society, in a more understandable and appropriate format and is thus unnecessary.  
Furthermore, Magna Carta is often misused to challenge other existing laws though these 
arguments never succeed.  Yet the fact that they are repeatedly made demonstrates that 
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Magna Carta facilitates the disrespecting and disregarding of other, properly enacted statutes.  
This undermines the coherency of the statute book and brings the law into disrepute. 
However it can be argued that whilst legally obsolete Magna Carta is of enduring symbolic 
value; it is the cornerstone of a historic building rather than a replaceable fixture.  It was a 
document in need, but also capable of, maturing into constitutional significance.209  Broad in 
its reforms, its framers intended it to be perpetual.210  It introduced principles, which through 
refinement, have since come to found democracies.  But even historic buildings need 
earthquake strengthening; a building, however beautiful and symbolic, is useless if unusable 
by modern standards.  The symbolic value of Magna Carta is so deeply embedded in detailed 
remedies that it is not the most effective protection possible for the rule of law. 
Statutes, as an alternative to common law, are about putting the law in one place, in general 
terms, rather than having to extract those rules from specific fact situations, case by case.211  
If statutes set out only general principles then someone, often judges, must fill in the gaps.  
On the other hand, if a statute encapsulates all the details then it has “frozen the development 
of the law in a particular time and place”.212  Some balance between those two extremes must 
be struck.  Magna Carta falls at both ends of the spectrum without achieving a compromising 
middle ground.  Magna Carta’s text is so detailed that it is indeed frozen in 1215.  If Magna 
Carta’s lasting value is as authority for the rule of law then chapter 29’s detailed rights are 
unnecessary.  On the other hand, Magna Carta as a symbol for the rule of law is so general 
that it leaves too much to the courts. 
Many argue that Magna Carta “must have a function in the modern world” or it would not 
have been included in the ILAA.213  They thus seem to believe that removing Magna Carta 
will significantly affect New Zealand’s constitution.  The replacement of the Habeas Corpus 
Act 1640 was “characterised as ‘removing the obsolete’ and it is clear that the repeal of the 
provision was not seen as having any constitutional significance at all”.214  The same is true 
of Magna Carta.  The rule of law does not need Magna Carta.  Nor do important rights such 
as the right against arbitrary imprisonment or delayed justice need Magna Carta.  Replacing it 
would not change the bounds of the rule of law but merely make it “a procedure based on 
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New Zealand practice and appropriate to New Zealand conditions”.215  Old principles can be 
retained if formatted appropriately to New Zealand conditions.216 
Redundant statutes remaining in force clutters the law.217  Redundancy is not a badge of 
failure for a statute; but it is an inevitability in any legal system that keeps up with its ever-
changing society.  “Time and events render most statutes obsolete in the end.”218  A mature 
legal system must be able to recognise and deal with redundant statutes.219  Unfortunately 
“[i]n a small country with easy resort to legislation we tend to reorganise ourselves 
continuously and rather incoherently.”220  Our statute book should not resemble a renovated 
house with extra wings and ensuites, the new carpet laid over the old. 
Unfortunately, a lack of post-enactment scrutiny of the ongoing necessity of legislation has 
made this the reality.221  Yet adherence to the rule of law requires evaluating how well 
legislation works in practice.222  If the last time a statute is measured against the rule of law is 
at a Select Committee or in a Section 7 Report then the rule of law is not providing the 
protection it is meant to.  Hindsight can reveal ambiguity, inaccessibility, incoherency, 
irrelevancy and inefficiency that were not previously apparent.  Hindsight has done exactly 
that for Magna Carta. 
Since the specifics of chapter 29 are conceded to be of no use, they should be removed in 
favour of a clear, understandable, concise commitment to the rule of law.  A phrase, outlining 
New Zealand’s commitment to the rule of law, perhaps akin to s 3(2) of the Supreme Court 
Act 2003, would suffice.  Since s 3(2) is in fact being removed, a similar phrase included in a 
preamble to the Constitution Act 1986 would be another option.  There is no need to put 
Magna Carta’s rights somewhere else since the Bill of Rights Act already exists.  Fear of 
loopholes should not cause an over complication of the law that makes it unusable for 
ordinary people.223  New Zealand should not transform its statute books into an antique shop 
of inspiring but redundant documents.  Magna Carta is more suitable as a historical document 
than as a statute. 
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B Language and Style of the Law 
Evaluating language and style requires determining Magna Carta’s likely readership because 
statutory language must suit the reader.  Few New Zealanders know of Magna Carta, let 
alone read it which suggests a readership restricted to legal professionals.  But this is 
inconsistent with the high proportion of self-represented litigants referring to Magna Carta.  
Whilst Magna Carta is not often read by the majority of the population, a significant 
proportion of those who do read it are non-lawyers.  This means that its language must be 
accessible and clear to ordinary people.224 
John Burrows defines an ordinary person reading a statute as someone who “is not a lawyer; 
is of reasonable intelligence and education; is not a practised reader of statutes; and has a real 
interest in knowing what a particular statute says”.225  Scholars differ on whether all ordinary 
people should be able to read all law.226  However there is some consensus that there are 
some statutes, such as food safety or employment statutes, which ordinary people must be 
able to understand.227  It is imperative that constitutional statutes are included in this 
category.  Although they deal with grand concepts, they provide the governing framework for 
society.  They also frequently arise in relation to criminal law issues where issues such as due 
process, freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, the presumption of innocence and 
jury trials are especially important.  Ordinary people must be able to access these documents 
so that they can know how to rely on the protections they are entitled to. 
New Zealand’s constitution, including Magna Carta needs to be more accessible and easy to 
understand.228  Accessibility requires that every reader, including non-lawyers, can 
understand from the statute the “full extent of his or her rights and obligations”.229  In order to 
effectively hold the executive to account, the public must be able to understand, access and 
use the appropriate constitutional tools.  Older acts can be particularly hard to understand.230  
Indeed, clarity is not Magna Carta’s strong suit; it “was not an exact statement of law, ... but a 
political document produced in a crisis”.231  Its provisions are imprecise and situated in a 
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society 800 years removed from New Zealand.232  Moreover, its terms, such as per legum 
terrae and exiled, are too ambiguous for the courts to apply them.233 
Magna Carta’s language is thus insufficiently clear for it to be properly accessible to non-
lawyers.  Consequently Magna Carta is frequently used incorrectly by self-representing 
litigants who do not understand New Zealand’s constitutional framework.  This is detrimental 
to these litigants who make impossible arguments on the basis of a “fundamental” document 
that in fact offers no protection.  The general population must trust the law in order to accept 
being ruled by it.234  Such trust does not come easily when there is a statute which on its face 
allocates rights but when raised in court is an embarrassingly ignorant argument.  False hope 
and disappointment do not breed trust in the law. 
Some argue that the next victory Magna Carta must win for society is greater access to 
justice.235  Usually it is high court and legal costs that render justice inaccessible.236  What is 
not so readily admitted as a cause of inaccessibility is law’s incomprehensibility to most non-
lawyers.  Unnecessarily complex or obscure law impairs an individual’s capacity to know 
how to act in conformity with their rights and obligations.237  This goes against the rule of 
law’s predictability requirement and impairs ordinary people’s ability to access justice.238  If 
the law itself was clear and plain then those who cannot afford lawyers would not be so 
adversely affected by that fact.  It is the legal profession’s responsibility to work towards 
such accessibility,239 yet it is most commonly the legal profession that refuses to relinquish 
Magna Carta to the depths of history.  Magna Carta’s continued presence detriments the 
clarity of the law.  If New Zealand is to get serious about accessibility to justice then it needs 
to remedy this. 
On the one hand judges laud Magna Carta’s power, yet over and over again their judgments 
contain fleeting dismissals of it as they “prefer more contemporary statutes and 
conventions”.240  Lawyers’ minimal use of Magna Carta compared with lay people indicates 
an inverse correlation between comprehension of New Zealand’s constitutional structure and 
a belief in Magna Carta’s usefulness.  Rather than being used to stay executive power, it is 
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used to challenge Parliament’s sovereignty, appeal drug convictions and avoid paying tax.  
People are free to use constitutional documents as they wish and of course the most well 
drafted statute can be misunderstood and misused by anyone sufficiently ignorant.  However, 
constitutional documents, if they are used correctly and effectively, have the potential to 
inspire confidence in ordinary New Zealanders regarding the protections they have against 
executive powers.  For such potential to be lost due to ambiguity and uncertainty causing 
frequent misuse is disappointing and destructive.  Promoting confidence in New Zealand’s 
unwritten constitution requires that any propensity for misunderstanding should be 
minimised. 
Additionally, Magna Carta’s continued statutory presence wastes judges’ time because they 
have to respond to highly misinformed and hopeless arguments.  This wastes both public 
funds and the private funds of litigants forced to defend Magna Carta claims.  This is 
particularly the case where there are numerous appeals on the same set of facts.241 
C Summary 
Magna Carta’s content is unnecessary and its language and style is unclear and inaccessible 
for the ordinary New Zealander.  The tendency to prioritise wide interpretations over 
allegiance to its text disrupts the rule of law.  The reluctance to replace redundant legislation 
should be overcome regarding Magna Carta.  Ultimately, it does not reach the standard 
required by the rule of law which it is supposed to represent.  This adds to the weight of 
previous arguments for Magna Carta’s replacement. 
V A Long, Long Way From Runnymede 
Magna Carta is commonly referred to as one statute among many that forms New Zealand’s 
unwritten constitution.242  It contains multiple fundamental human rights which make it 
constitutional.243  It also is argued to stand for values which are pivotal in New Zealand’s 
constitutional framework.  The following arguments regarding Magna Carta’s suitability as a 
constitutional document apply to both these aspects of its constitutionality.  Section A 
evaluates Magna Carta against the characteristics New Zealanders desire in a constitution.  
Section B discusses the reluctance to relinquish Magna Carta.  Even if Magna Carta does 
stand for all it is claimed to, its contribution to New Zealand’s constitution does not 
necessitate that it remain a statute.  Ultimately it is concluded that Magna Carta should be 
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repealed and a reference to its values should be introduced as a preamble to the Constitution 
Act 1986. 
A A Best Possible Constitution 
Constitutional statutes should meet additional criteria above and beyond those of ordinary 
statutes.  The 2013 Constitutional Conversation undertook to raise awareness and provoke 
discussion on New Zealand’s constitution.  It found that “[p]articipants’ aspirations for the 
constitution were fairly consistent: to provide for stable, adaptable, legitimate, representative, 
responsive, principled, considered, accountable, transparent and inclusive government that 
aspires to ensure people’s well-being.”244  Key themes that emerged from the conversation 
included New Zealand’s unique history and values, balancing diversity with a sense of 
belonging, justice and fairness, having a voice and appropriate checks on power.245  Recalling 
the analysis contained in Part II, this Section argues that Magna Carta does not measure up 
well against these values and themes. 
On its face, reliance on an 800 year old statute enhances stability.246  But if that statute’s 
effect is contingent on the changing interpretations of lawyers, historians and judges across 
the centuries, then that stability is a fallacy.247  It is in tension with the same scholars’ 
arguments that Magna Carta is a living document, the myth of which is more important than 
the text itself.  There is no stability in myths, which, by very definition, lack a discernible 
basis in fact.  Magna Carta’s alleged modern applicability is not because its text is adaptable, 
but rather because its text has been disregarded in favour of its underlying principles. 
Magna Carta’s origins are so far removed from modern New Zealanders by time, distance, 
culture and societal values that it can hardly be said to be legitimate and representative of 
New Zealand.  To most people Magna Carta is simply a foreign relic and an irrelevant 
document.  But New Zealanders prefer New Zealand-made solutions to constitutional 
issues.248  Choosing to retain Magna Carta in 1988 out of fear it may have some as yet 
unknown use is very different from choosing to enact from scratch something that has 
“negligible practical use”.249  Given a blank slate, it is unlikely that New Zealanders would 
choose Magna Carta as their authority for the rule of law. 
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Constitutional legitimacy depends on the extent to which the general population considers the 
constitution reflects its values.250  Constitutions are not wholly substitutable from one nation 
to the next.251  Whilst Magna Carta has gained rhetorical force and become a focal point for 
liberty and rule of law advocates, it does not generally reflect New Zealand values.  After all, 
it is not the public law scholars whom a constitution should inspire, but the ordinary New 
Zealanders running dairy farms and software start-ups.  They want a constitution that conveys 
both diversity and belonging.252  But Magna Carta was a peace treaty born out of the violence 
and disunity of a foreign civil war.  It was not a considered, well-thought through document.  
It was a compromise; compiled at speed to avert impending civil war. 
Magna Carta’s highly specific text restricts its general applicability yet the principles it stands 
for, such as the rule of law, are enduringly applicable.  However, as discussed above, these 
principles cannot be obtained from Magna Carta by any legitimate interpretative process.  A 
better constitutional document would waive the unnecessary details and contain express 
references to the principles it embodies rather than having them embedded in intricate 
historical text.  Such a pivotal principle as the rule of law should not be expressed through a 
document most people cannot understand on its face, let alone in its context. 
Furthermore, the need for Magna Carta’s constitutional rights protection has waned with the 
passage of the Bill of Rights Act.  The latter is preferable because it is a modern piece of 
legislation, formulated with clear wording.  It is understandable and therefore accessible, 
unlike Magna Carta. 
Given the above evaluation it should be clear that New Zealand can do better than Magna 
Carta.  A New Zealand-made equivalent would have a greater chance of defeating New 
Zealanders’ apathy towards constitutional matters than the ancient and foreign Magna Carta.  
New Zealand’s commitment to the rule of law would be better codified by a preamble to the 
Constitution Act 1986.253  The Constitution Act describes the three branches of government 
and their respective roles and powers.254  Such a preamble could affirm principles such as the 
rule of law, liberty, fairness and equality.  New Zealand should aspire to a constitution 
formed of documents crafted by New Zealanders, for New Zealanders. 
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B Fondness for the Past 
History and law go together.255  History is essential to interpretation and precedent as well as 
adding picturesqueness to the law.256  History is also central to constitutional development 
and legitimacy; it shapes the relations between the Crown, Parliament and the courts.257  New 
Zealand’s constitution was evolved by English history and then adapted to serve New 
Zealand’s interests.258  Despite its usefulness, history can be distorted both unknowingly and 
deliberately - many “[l]awyers want a past that suits their particular purpose at the time they 
look back.”259 
The tradition of revering Magna Carta is the unspoken but underlying reason it has been kept 
so long.  The legal profession is reluctant to relinquish ancient statutes to be only history and 
no longer law.  Elaborating on this, Matthew Festa wrote that legal citation of historical 
documents:260 
… conveys a sense of authority and legitimacy; it grounds arguments in continuity 
with tradition and precedent; and, not least, because the law is in large part about 
the reconstructions of past events. 
In Magna Carta’s case, all this has been taken to the extreme.  Many lawyers would have one 
believe that the principle that characterises our legal system as fair and equal hinges upon a 
myth of a statute that neither mentions that principle nor was the principle’s origin. 
Rhetorical use of history strives to add legitimacy to the decisions of unelected judges by 
connecting those decisions to historic statutes.261  Much of the judge-initiated use of Magna 
Carta in New Zealand is of this form - a fleeting reference to add legitimacy.  But the rule of 
law’s legitimacy does not need Magna Carta.  Tamanaha argues that for the rule of law to 
exist it must be taken “for granted as a necessary, proper and existing part of [the] political-
legal system”; a pervasive cultural belief.262  The rule of law indeed has “powerful rhetorical 
force”.263  The principle seemingly stands alone; it does not need Magna Carta to remain 
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influential in New Zealand.264  Magna Carta embodied certain pre-existing values such as 
liberty and the rule of law in specific, tangible rights.  But it is neither the source of those 
values nor their complete representation. 
The government is currently removing the legislative reference to the rule of law at the 
protest of many.265  It seems that they think the rule of law is fundamentally ingrained in New 
Zealand culture such that legislative reference to it is unnecessary and its removal will not 
hinder the effect of the rule of law in New Zealand.  Such reasoning, if true, can be extended 
to Magna Carta.  Magna Carta contains no explicit reference to the rule of law and is more 
out of date, ambiguous and hard to interpret than the Judicature Act 1908 ever was.  If a 100 
year old statute that expressly refers to the rule of law can be repealed because it is out of 
date, then an 800 year old one with no reference to it should not be retained. 
The senior judiciary argues that it is unwise to assume that those values go without saying 
given the general population’s ignorance and misunderstanding of them.266  Indeed, whilst the 
rule of law can stand on its own, its statutory embodiment is advised in the interests of clarity 
and accessibility.  Ensuring that the rule of law is included in a different New Zealand statute 
also mitigates any potentially adverse effects arising from the process of repealing Magna 
Carta.  If, as suggested above, a statement affirming the rule of law is incorporated into the 
Constitution Act, then there should be no scope for misinterpreting Magna Carta’s repeal as a 
derision of the rule of law.  The repeal will be seen for what it is - a solidifying of New 
Zealand’s commitment to the rule of law by expressing such commitment in a modern, 
accessible form. 
When it comes down to it, there needs to be a distinction drawn between the role of statutes 
and the role of history in judicial decision-making.  Law students are taught repealed statutes 
and overturned cases in order to gain greater understanding of the context, heritage and 
development of the law.  Rhetorical use of historical references to add legitimacy does not 
require the historical reference to still be in force as a statute.  It is the idea’s ancient pedigree 
that adds legitimacy, not the antiquity of the statute it is expressed in.  The repeal of the 
Habeas Corpus Act 1640 does not merely provide analogous arguments for Magna Carta; it 
speaks specifically to the absence of any modern need for ancient protections.  Whilst those 
old Acts are constitutionally significant and symbolise victories against ruthless monarchs, 
those Acts themselves are not necessary.  Their content and safeguards can be rewritten into 
modern legislation to ensure the continuity of those ideas without requiring the continuity of 
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the statutes.  Our legal system can celebrate the rule of law’s continuity, without requiring the 
continued presence of one statute that utilised it. 
Another reason behind the legal profession’s propensity to retain ancient statutes is their 
belief in the past’s normative value.  This belief itself is ancient.  The barons who framed 
Magna Carta sought to recreate an idealised past.267  Similarly it was important to Coke and 
his contemporaries that the law they asserted was long-standing and unchanged from what 
was ancient history to them.268  As Lord Sumption said, “[t]he authority of their legal 
programme depended in large measure on its supposed antiquity.”269  New Zealand’s Chief 
Justice has conceded that the “best evidence of the importance of Magna Carta” is its 800 
year old lineage.270  Yet while New Zealanders want our history to be acknowledged they do 
not want it to control us.271  Posner rejects the suggestion that history necessarily has any 
normative advantage over the present.272  JC Holt says “[i]ndividual freedom can be justified 
by many methods.  There is no logical reason for including Magna Carta among them.”273  In 
another publication he says “it is by no means obvious why men should continue to look back 
to an antiquated feudal document as a justification for legal and political arguments”.274  It is 
unnecessary to seek legitimacy in the past. 
Seeking too much legitimacy in the past belittles the ability of modern lawyers, politicians, 
judges and legislation drafters to make progress in the articulation of constitutional values 
and frameworks.275  Such self-deprecation is both unhelpful and misguided.  There is no 
justification for the excessive deference in favour of drafters and judges of eras gone by.276  
Whether or not today’s drafters are the betters of King John and the feudal barons, it should 
be clear that they are not ours.  New Zealand is capable of drafting its own constitutional 
statutes.  We know our people, we know our culture, we know our laws.277 
People forget that Magna Carta restated law that already existed.  It is claimed that Magna 
Carta’s retention is evidence of law’s continuous development because Magna Carta’s 
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meaning has morphed and grown.  Yet the exact opposite is true.  The barons brought the old 
law forward into their context by restating it in Magna Carta.  We of the twenty-first century 
cling to Magna Carta as though it were the ultimate and complete expression of our 
constitutional principles.  But there is nothing about Magna Carta that makes it the ideal 
expression of the rule of law.  We have lost what it means to be constantly developing, 
updating and restating the law.278  There is a specific harm in retaining Magna Carta - the 
misuse of it by self-representing litigants in a way that breeds distrust in the law and 
undermines its coherency.  However there is a wider harm at stake.  The retention of Magna 
Carta is symbolic of the legal system’s fondness for the archaic and inaccessible in the name 
of tradition and at the expense of the ordinary person.  New Zealand needs a legal profession 
that is more pragmatic than sentimental and which prioritises accessibility over tradition. 
Undue reverence for history makes people suspicious of innovation.279  Posner says that 
“[t]hese ingrained attitudes are obstacles to anyone who wants to reorient law in a more 
pragmatic direction.”280  Rather than stating the law anew to match today’s new problems, 
lawyers tend to “find the already existing solution to the new … problem[s] in authoritative 
decisions made centuries ago”.281  This is exactly the case regarding Magna Carta.  A clearer, 
more understandable, more relevant expression of the rule of law is more likely to gain the 
general population’s support than Magna Carta is.  Yet reverence for the latter has clouded 
the legal profession’s vision so that they reject such a pragmatic evolution of New Zealand’s 
constitutional framework.282 
The legal profession’s fondness for Magna Carta is unjustifiable given that the rule of law 
could very easily be incorporated into another, more suitable constitutional document.  We, 
like the barons, can look to history for our inspiration.  But let us follow further in their 
footsteps and bring the old law into our context by restating it in terms that are relevant today. 
C Summary 
Magna Carta does not meet the standards expected of constitutional documents in New 
Zealand.  Furthermore, contrary to the beliefs of most lawyers, its age is a factor against its 
retention, not for it.  New Zealand deserves and is capable of producing a constitutional 
document that reverberates not through the epochs of history, but within the bounds of our 
own culture, values and identity. 
                                                 
278  At 576. 
279  At 573. 
280  At 573. 
281  At 580–581. 
282  See Joseph, above n 102, at [5.5.4]. 
Laws522  Katja Heesterman 
42 
VI Conclusion 
Magna Carta was annulled two months after its signing because King John only signed it to 
end the rebellion - he had no intention of having his governance reformed or his power 
restricted.  Its first reissue was made possible by John’s early death and his son’s young age.  
It is to this document that history has attributed the rule of law, equality before the law and a 
vast array of rights.  But Magna Carta is simply no longer necessary. 
Part II’s exploration of case law illustrates Magna Carta’s redundancy and frequent misuse.  
Words are attributed new meanings, rights are expanded far beyond the text and significant 
principles result from widespread reliance on misinterpretations rather than the text.  It was 
also shown that retaining Magna Carta, as a back-up for rights, is unnecessary, since a 
suitable, comprehensive, and New Zealand-specific replacement has emerged. 
Part III determined that interpreting Magna Carta as an ordinary statute could not justify the 
myths about its meaning and significance that have become so widespread.  Those myths are 
too dependent on the interpreter’s discretion rather than a clear legal rule.  Though its 
constitutionality may suggest an alternative approach, focusing only on Magna Carta’s 
principles is unsuitable.  Since the interpretation of Magna Carta that produces these myths is 
insupportable, those myths are also insupportable.  They should no longer be believed or 
relied on. 
Magna Carta is claimed to stand for the rule of law yet Part IV showed that Magna Carta 
itself does not comply with the rule of law.  Building on Part III, this Part showed how 
Magna Carta is unnecessary, overly detailed and inaccessible because of its language.  Magna 
Carta and New Zealand’s living constitution are separated by both time and distance.  Part V 
then measured Magna Carta against New Zealanders’ desires for a constitution and found it 
wanting.  This part also critiqued the tendency of the legal profession to defer to the past 
instead of deriving new, unique solutions to unique, modern New Zealand situations. 
In a nation with a strong democracy, a bill of rights and strong egalitarian values Magna 
Carta’s value has paled.  Judges are bereft of any need to use it.  Moreover its frequent 
misuse means that its continued presence is not harmless.  It symbolises the inaccessibility of 
the law to the ordinary New Zealander and facilitates misunderstandings and hopeless 
arguments in court.  To better ensure ongoing respect for the law, Magna Carta should be 
repealed.  New Zealand has better statutes, better processes and better assurances of equality 
than England did in 1215.  New Zealanders should have confidence in our own constitutional 
structures.  The legal profession fears that Magna Carta’s removal would convey a 
disregarding of the rule of law.  The reality is that Magna Carta’s repeal and the rule of law’s 
incorporation into a modern New Zealand statute would better promote the rule of law’s 
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importance than Magna Carta’s continuance.  It is appropriate to close with Lord Sumption’s 
closing remarks from his Magna Carta address:283 
… do we really need the force of myth to sustain our belief in democracy?  Do we 
need to derive our belief in democracy and the rule of law from a group of 
muscular conservative millionaires from the north of England, who thought in 
French, knew no Latin or English, and died more than three quarters of a 
millennium ago?  I rather hope not. 
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